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Double Blind Comparisons: A New Approach to the Database 
Aggregation Problem 
Abstract. The Data Aggregation Problem occurs when a large collection of data takes on a higher security 
level than any of its individual component records. Traditional approaches of breaking up the data and 
restricting access on a “need to know” basis take away one of the great advantages of collecting the data in 
the first place.  
This paper introduces a new cryptographic primitive, Double Blind Comparisons, which allows two co-
operating users, who each have an encrypted secret, to determine the equality or inequality of those two 
secrets, even though neither user can discover any information about what the secret is.  
This paper also introduces a new problem in bilinear groups, conjectured to be a hard problem. Assuming 
this conjecture, it is shown that neither user can discover any information about whether the secrets are equal, 
without the other user’s co-operation. 
We then look at how Double Blind Comparisons can be used to mitigate the Data Aggregation Problem. 
Finally, the paper concludes with some suggested possibilities for future research and some other potential 
uses for Double Blind Comparisons. 
Keywords: Database aggregation, inference, private record linkage, privacy-preserving secure joins, Secure 
Multi-Party Computation 
1   Database aggregation and inference 
Data Aggregation and Inference have been recognized as a problem since at least 1982 [6], 
although standardized definitions have been lacking. NCSC Technical Report 005, Volume 1/5 [25] 
describes inference and aggregation as “different but related problems.” It defines the inference 
problem as the problem “of users deducing (or inferring) higher level information based upon lower, 
visible data”, following Morgenstern [23], and the aggregation problem as the problem that occurs 
“when classifying and protecting collections of data that have a higher security level than any of the 
elements that comprise the aggregate”, following Denning et al. [10]. 
Both aggregation and inference can take place within a single database. This paper, however, deals 
with the situation where data is divided among two or more databases.  
Denning et al. [10] identified two different types of aggregation. In this paper, we follow the 
terminology of White et al. [31] and refer to these as cardinal aggregation and inference aggregation. 
Although both types of aggregation can occur within a single database, we are concerned here with 
aggregation across multiple databases. 
Cardinal aggregation occurs when an adversary collects a large number of similar records, each of 
which by itself is of little importance, but which by sheer volume become sensitive. An example of 
this often used in the literature (see e.g. [24]) is the CIA telephone directory, where each individual 
entry is of little significance, but the entire directory is considered classified. 
Inference aggregation occurs when multiple databases are joined, creating virtual records with a 
large number of fields. While the sensitivity of the individual records may have been analyzed and 
found to be low, the sensitivity of the resulting virtual records has likely never been analyzed, and 
may be quite high.  
As a simple example, consider the following two databases. The first is a military personnel 
database, containing two fields - a military Service Number (SN) and a job classification, with the SN 
as the primary key. The second database is a military medical database, containing the employee SN 
and a medical status, again with the SN as the primary key.  
Consider the records for the member with SN C55-111-555. The personnel database shows this 
person to be a CF-18 Fighter Pilot. The medical database shows this person to be 4 months pregnant.  
Neither of these facts, in isolation, provides any information about the operational effectiveness of 
the person’s military unit. When combined, however, they allow an adversary to infer that there is a 
CF-18 fighter pilot who is currently unavailable to fly combat missions – information that might be of 
operational significance. 
This research presents a new cryptographic primitive, Double Blind Comparisons, which allow two 
co-operating users, each in possession of a different ciphertext, to determine if the associated 
plaintexts are equal or not, even though neither user knows anything about the plaintext other than its 
encrypted value.  
Neither user learns anything about the plaintext as a result of the comparison. With the exception of 
the trusted third party who issued the encrypted secrets, no one individual is able to carry out a 
comparison of two differing ciphertexts. 
This primitive differs from Secure Multi-Party Computation [33]. With Secure Multi-Party 
Computation, the users each know their own secret and compute some function of the combined 
secrets, without revealing any information about their own secrets to the other parties; with Double 
Blind Comparisons, the users do not know the secrets they are comparing.  
This is an important distinction, as it allows two users to determine whether or not their two secrets 
are equal. If the secret is known to one of the users, then the knowledge that the two secrets are equal 
immediately reveals the value of the other user’s secret. This rules out Secure Multi-Party 
Computation as a solution.  
Database inference may be made more difficult by increasing the difficulty of inference 
aggregation. For example, a government database may identify individuals by a Social Insurance 
Number, a bank by a customer ID number, and a business by an employee ID. Records from one 
database cannot then easily be linked to records from another. However, there are many cases where it 
is necessary to match a record from one database to its corresponding record in another.  
Double Blind Comparisons will allow us to distribute a large dataset among multiple databases, 
while retaining the ability to match and compare records across two or more of these databases. For 
example, an employee’s personnel records can be matched to their medical profile, but only if the 
administrators for the personnel and medical databases co-operate. Because the records cannot be 
linked otherwise, the security requirements on the two databases can be made much less stringent. 
2   Preliminaries  
2.1   Discrete Logarithm Problem 
Given a group    and two elements         , the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) is to find an 
element     
  such that       whenever such an element exists. 
2.2   Diffie-Hellman Problem 
The Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption states that, given            , for a randomly-
chosen generator   and random exponents       
 , it is computationally intractable to compute the 
value     . The associated problem of computing     is the Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem 
(CDHP). 
The Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption states that, given               , for a randomly-
chosen generator   and random exponents       
 , it is computationally intractable to determine 
whether        . The associated problem of determining whether        is the Decisional Diffie-
Hellman Problem (DDHP). 
2.3   Cryptographic Bilinear Map 
A mapping  (   )           is called a bilinear mapping if it satisfies the following 
properties: 
Bilinear property:  (     )    (   )   
Non-Degenerate. If     are generators of   , then  (   ) is a generator of   . 
Computability property: There is an efficient algorithm to compute  (   ) for all       . 
Our proof of security assumes the existence of a cryptographic bilinear map  (   )        
    over groups       of prime order p in which the Discrete Logarithm Problem is hard, and where 
the CDHP is hard in   . 
2.4   Perfect Indistinguishability 
We follow the terminology of Damgard and Nielsen [5].  
Consider a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm  . If we run   on input string  , the output 
will be a probability distribution: for every possible string   there some probability that   is output 
when   was the input. Call this probability   ( ).    is the probability distribution of  ’s output, on 
input  .  
Next, consider two probabilistic algorithms    . We run both   and   on the same input  , and we 
choose one of the outputs produced, which we call  .  
Definition: Given two PPT algorithms    , we say that     are perfectly indistinguishable, 
written      , if       for every  . 
2.5   DDHP in bilinear groups 
The DDHP is easily solved for group    if a bilinear map  (   ) exists from          , as 
follows: 
Given               , it is easily shown that  
      iff  (     )   (    ). It should be 
noted that this technique requires knowledge of the base  . 
3   Related work 
3.1   Secure Multi-Party Computation 
Secure multi-party computation was initially suggested by A. C. Yao in a 1982 paper [33], in which 
he introduced the millionaire problem: Alice and Bob are two millionaires who want to find out who 
is richer without either revealing to the other the precise amount of their wealth. Yao proposed a 
solution allowing Alice and Bob to satisfy their curiosity while respecting the constraints. In general, 
Secure Multi-Party Computation allows   users, each of whom has a secret   , to compute some 
function  (*  +   
 ), without allowing user    to learn the value    for any      . 
Because each user    knows his or her own secret   , one problem that cannot be solved with 
secure multi-party computation is whether       for any     , as this would immediately the value 
of    to user   .  
With Double Blind Comparisons, neither of the users knows the value of the secret they are 
comparing, and thus the question of equality can be resolved without compromising the secret. 
3.2   Prior work on Database Aggregation and Inference 
Data Aggregation and Inference were identified as problems at least as early as 1982 [5]. Ten years 
later, NCSC-TG-010 [24], included two short sections on the combined problem.  
Early research focused mainly on Multi-Level Secure (MLS) database systems, in which both 
sensitive and non-sensitive data are stored; the MLS system relies on classification rules and access 
controls to ensure that sensitive data is released only to an appropriately cleared user. The problem 
then was to ensure that the results of multiple unclassified queries would not allow an uncleared user 
to infer classified data. NCSC TECHNICAL REPORT – 005 Volume 1 of 5 [25] dealt with this in 
greater detail. 
This early work focused entirely on preventing the inference of sensitive data from non-sensitive 
queries. It was tacitly assumed that the sensitive data would be available from other sources. 
However, as database technology has improved dramatically over the past two decades, the 
advantages of large scale unclassified databases have started to override the security concerns of 
allowing smaller databases to be combined.  
For example, and especially since 9/11, multi-agency security teams are commonly established for 
any large scale event which is a credible terrorist target. Each agency may have a file on a particular 
individual, but for security/privacy reasons, they are unable to simply join their databases. How, then, 
can they determine whether this individual constitutes a threat, and if so, how serious a threat? 
3.3   Prior work based on Privacy Preservation  
A closely related problem from the field of privacy is the study of privacy-preserving databases. In 
this case, the objective is to allow the data to be used (e.g. for statistical or research purposes) while 
preventing the release of personally identifying information.  
Quasi-identifiers, k-anonymity, l-diversity, and t-closeness 
Sweeney [30] showed the existence of quasi-identifiers – groups of attributes that had the potential 
to uniquely identify an individual, even though the data had supposedly been anonymized. [30] 
demonstrated that approximately 87% of the US population can be uniquely identified by the 
combination of three attributes – date of birth, 5-digit zip code, and gender. In [29], Sweeney was able 
to re-identify the medical records for then-Governor of Massachusetts William Weld, based on these 
three attributes. 
To address this, the techniques of k-anonymity [26][27][28][29], l-diversity [18], and t-closeness 
[14] were developed. These techniques are focused on preventing the joining of multiple tables; in 
effect, they address the inference aggregation problem by preventing the join from being made. As 
such, these techniques are separate from, but complementary to, our proposed technique, which is 
designed to allow secure matching of corresponding records to be made in controlled circumstances. 
Information Sharing Across Private Databases 
Agrawal et al. [1] developed techniques to enable two co-operating users to create secure joins and 
intersections of database tables, using commutative encryption. However, their method relies on the 
databases themselves being adequately protected, whereas our technique requires only that the users’ 
private keys remain protected. 
Private Record Linkage  
Record Linkage is the problem of matching corresponding records from disparate collections, 
where there may be no unique identifiers, using statistical methods. Record linkage typically assumes 
there are no keys that uniquely identify individuals across distinct datasets; instead, linkage relies on 
probabilistic methods and machine learning algorithms. 
For example, a personnel database gives the following information for Captain Juanita Mendes 
Smith, CF-18 pilot, age 32, auburn hair, hazel eyes, height 5’ 2”, weight 118 pounds. Is this the same 
Mrs. J. M. Smith, early 30’s, brown hair, green eyes, height 5’ 2”, weight 140 pounds, 4 months 
pregnant, listed in the local hospital database? 
Private record linkage [32] is the problem of matching such corresponding records without 
releasing any personally identifiable information. Our research, by comparison, focuses on the 
matching of records for which encrypted unique identifiers exist. 
Privacy-Preserving Joins 
Kantarcioglu et al. [13] addresses the issue of matching pairs of records which apply to the same 
subject, while precluding invasion of that subject’s privacy. In this work, all records are encrypted by 
the researcher who gathers the data, using the public key of a Trusted Third Party (TTP) known as the 
Key Server (KS). All records are stored in their encrypted form on a central Data Storage (DS) 
database.  
The Data Storage administrator can determine to a high degree of certainty when two records refer 
to the same subject, but cannot decrypt the records. After identifying candidate pairs of records, DS 
submits them to the TTP who is the only one who can decrypt the records.  
The TTP will return the requested information only if the records are, indeed, referring to the same 
subject. 
Disadvantages of this system include the reliance on the separation of duties and the existence of a 
trusted third party, and the concern that the DS and the KS may collaborate.  
If KS could gain access to the entire DS database, it would be a simple matter to decrypt all the 
data. Thus, an enormous amount of trust would have to be placed in KS, simply to protect what is 
essentially unclassified data. So, as with Agrawal et al. [1] this method requires the database to be 
strongly protected, whereas our technique requires protection only for the users’ private keys.  
4   Proposed Solution 
4.1   Conjecture 
Let        be cyclic groups of prime order p in which the Discrete Logarithm Problem is hard, for 
which  (   )            is a cryptographic bilinear map. 
The following problem is conjectured to be hard: 
Given                       , where           , determine whether  
     . 
This can be rewritten as  
Given          
    
     
      , where     
                    , determine whether 
  
    
  . 
Let O be an oracle that, on input *       
    
     
  +, can determine whether   
    
  . This is 
equivalent to determining whether   
     
   , which is the DDHP, but without knowledge of the 
base   . 
It is known that the DDHP is easy in bilinear groups if the base is known, but the technique used 
does not work if the base is unknown.  
Therefore, I conjecture, but was unable to prove, that the above problem is hard. 
4.2   Overview 
In discussing this system, we consider the following parties: a submitter (Alice), a responder (Bob), 
and a Trusted Central Authority (Ted). 
Alice and Bob each maintain a database of items; each item i is assigned a unique identifier Ni. 
However, none of them know the value Ni; in their databases, the item is identified by a one-way 
encryption of Ni; respectively Ea(Ni), Eb(Ni).  
In his database, Ted maintains the link between the item i and its identifier Ni. e.g. {i = Captain 
Juanita Mendes Smith; Ni = C55-111-555}. Ted is the only one who knows the values {Ni}.  
In her (resp. his) database, Alice (resp. Bob) uses the value j = Ea(Ni) (respectively k = Eb(Ni) ) as 
the index and stores data about item i (e.g. military occupation qualifications, or medical status) but 
not the item identifier. E.g. {index = j = Ea(Ni); Military occupation = CF-18 pilot}.  
Note that the indices j, k of j , k bear no association with the index i of Ni, or with each other. 
4.3   Set-up 
Let        be cyclic groups of prime order   in which the Discrete Logarithm Problem is hard, for 
which  (   )            is a cryptographic bilinear map. 
Let    be integers known only to Ted.  
Let (    )  (respectively  (    )) be Alice’s (respectively Bob’s) private key. (      are 
generators of   .) 
For a given identifier M:  
Alice chooses      
  and sends    
  to Ted. 
Ted computes and sends   
   to Alice.  
Alice chooses  , where the     record is the next available free entry in database DBa . She 
computes      ( ) for some suitable encryption function E with key   (e.g. AES). She also 
computes    (  
  )        
    and stores it as the index attribute for the     record in database 
DBa . Using    rather than   ensures that each record index is encrypted with a different exponent.  
Bob likewise communicates with Ted and stores    (  
  )        
   
 as the index attribute for 
the     record in database DBb , where the     record is the next available free entry in DBb . 
4.4   Double Blind Comparison 
Define       if  
       (  )   
        (  ) ; i.e.       
    and       
   
 are both one-way 
encryptions of the same (hidden) value  . 
To determine whether       , where       
    ( )
 and       
    ( )
 , Alice chooses a random 
number   and sends Bob (  
      
 ) . 
Bob calculates: 
    (  
      )    (     )
       ( )  
    (  
    
  )    (     )
       ( ) 
                      ( )     ( )                      
4.5   Example 
To give an example of how this works, suppose Carol is a flight dispatcher who is trying to put 
together a low-level CF-18 reconnaissance mission. She needs to know if Captain Juanita “Joan” 
Smith is qualified and capable to fly CF-18s on such a mission. Alice is the database operator in 
charge of the base personnel database, and Bob is in charge of the base hospital medical records. 
In her database, Carol uses the value    = Ec(  ) as the index and stores the item identifier. E.g. 
{index =    = Ec(  );   = Juanita Smith;   = C55-111-555}. 
In this example, the protocol is invoked twice – once with Carol as the submitter and Alice as the 
responder, and a second time with Alice as the submitter and Bob as the responder. 
First invocation – Carol to Alice 
1. Carol looks up Captain Smith’s identifier   , chooses a random exponent  , and sends 
  
      
  where (    ) is Carol’s private key, to Alice, along with a request to know if this 
individual is currently qualified to fly CF-18s on combat missions. 
2. Alice searches through her database until she finds      . (This is extremely inefficient for 
large databases. Later we will look at ways to modify this technique to conduct binary 
searches.) She confirms that    is qualified and current as a pilot on CF-18s. She next needs 
to verify that    is medically fit to fly combat missions. 
Second invocation – Alice to Bob 
Alice chooses a random exponent    and sends   
       
   to Bob, along with a request to 
know if this individual is medically fit to fly on combat missions. 
Bob searches through his database until he finds      . He finds that    is 4 months 
pregnant. 
Response to second invocation –Bob to Alice 
Bob advises Alice that employee   
   is limited to restricted flight duties (commercial and 
pressurized transport aircraft only; no aerobatics). 
Response to first invocation –Alice to Carol 
Alice advises Carol that employee   
  is not able to fly CF-18 combat missions.  
Alternatively, Carol could contact Bob directly to obtain Captain Smith’s medical flight status.  
Points to note: 
 Carol does not know the reason why Captain Smith is not available to fly the mission. In 
particular, she does not find out that her friend Juanita is pregnant, as she has no need to know 
this information. 
 Alice does not know the identity of the individual for whom the query was issued. She learns 
nothing beyond the fact that this individual is currently not medically cleared to fly combat 
missions. 
 Bob learns nothing about the individual beyond what is already contained in his own database, 
although - depending on the wording of the query - he may be able to infer that this individual is 
a flight crew member (e.g. pilot, navigator, or flight attendant). 
5   Security 
First of all, note that given       
    ( )
, even if       are known, recovering   ( ) is equivalent to 
solving the DLP. So other than Ted, no user of the system knows the values *  +. 
Ted is never given the values of         
  . 
We demonstrate the correctness. Informally, correctness means that an honest submitter, submitting a 
request to an honest responder, will receive a correct result if and only if the request is valid. 
We then analyze the following attacks: 
 Alice knows the contents of DBa and her own secret key (    ); she obtains a copy of Bob’s 
database DBb. Alice succeeds if, without Bob’s co-operation, she can choose any     DBa and 
confirm which     DBb corresponds to   . 
 Bob knows the contents of DBb and his own secret key (   ); he obtains a copy of Alice’s 
database DBa. He receives a query (  
     ) from Alice, from which he is able to determine 
    DBb such that     . Bob succeeds if he can determine which     DBa is the subject of 
Alice’s query. 
 Ted knows all the *  +, and obtains a copy of Alice’s database DBa. Ted succeeds if, given any 
   and any     DBa, he can determine whether      
    
. 
5.1   Correctness 
Let  be an entry in DBa, and  be an entry in DBb, where      
    and      
   ; i.e.     . 
Alice chooses      and sends (  
  ,  ) to Bob. (For convenience, we leave out the subscripts for 
      and  .) 
Then Bob can demonstrate, without knowledge of Alice’s secret key (    ) but with knowledge of 
his own secret key (    ), that     . 
Conversely, if  (     
 ) =  (  
    ), where      
   and      
  , then   . 
Proof:  
     
    and    
    .  
 (     
 )   (  
       
 )   (      )
      and  
 (  
    ) =  (  
      
   ) =  (      )
       
Conversely, suppose  (     
 ) =  (  
    ) , where      
   and      
   . Then     as 
follows: 
 (  
    )     (  
      
  )     (      )
     and  
 (     
 ) =  (  
      
 )=  (      )
       
Since   
      
  are generators of   ,  (  
      
 )   (      )
    is a generator of   , and so 
    . 
5.2   Unlinkability 
To prove unlinkability, we prove that neither Alice nor Bob, given full disclosure of both databases 
DBa and DBb, can obtain an advantage in linking any pair of records between the two databases 
without the other’s co-operation. In this, Alice is the submitter, while Bob is the responder in a 
transaction initiated by Alice. 
Alice 
Assume Alice knows her own secret key, plus all the entries    in DBa, and all the entries    in 
DBb. 
Let U, V be PPT algorithms as follows: 
U, given input       for some specific    in DBa, returns the unique entry    in DBb for which 
    . 
V, given input       for some specific    in DBa , returns an entry    in DBb which does not 
correspond to   in DBa . 
Then U    V . 
Proof:  
For any set      
            
    ,      
    , and      
    , with       , show that there 
exist        such that       
   ,      
    . 
Because   
   is a generator,     such that (  
  )                     
   exists with     
     . Since       ,       . 
Set        ; then        ; then      
    ,      
   , and      
   , with      . 
Let O be an oracle that, on input *     
         +, with either       or      , outputs 
  *   + .  
Let    = pr*     
                 +; in other words,     is the probability that O outputs the 
correct answer. When        a correct answer will be    , and an incorrect answer will be 
   . When        a correct answer will be    and an incorrect answer will be   .  
Let    (        ) be the probability that O outputs the correct answer when Bob’s secret key is 
(    )        
                   
    . 
Let    (      ) be the probability that O outputs the correct answer when Bob’s secret key is 
(    )        
                  
    . 
Since the output of O is independent of (          ) and (         ), it follows that 
   (        )      (      )       . 
However, a correct answer when the secret values are (       ) is an incorrect answer when 
those values are (      ). 
Therefore,    (        )        (      ) ; i.e.             , or          . 
Therefore, Alice has no advantage in distinguishing   from  ; i.e.       . 
  
Bob 
Bob receives a request (  
      
 ) from Alice, where   is unknown to him. 
Assume Bob knows all the entries    in Alice’s database DBa, in addition to his own secret key and 
all the entries    in DBb . Bob can determine that Alice is inquiring about the entity    for some 
particular   . He wants to know which record    is the subject of Alice’s inquiry.  
In particular, if Bob picks a specific record     DBa, he succeeds if he can determine whether 
      . 
Assuming conjecture 4.1, this is a hard problem. 
Proof:  
     
    ( )
. Since Bob knows   , he can easily compute   
  ( )
. Also, since Bob knows that 
     , he knows that   
    
    ( )
.  
Thus Bob knows      
  ( )    
     
    ( )       
    ( )
, and wishes to determine whether 
  
   ( )    
    ( )
. 
By conjecture 4.1, this is a hard problem. 
  
Ted 
Ted knows all the *  + and all the {  } from DBa. Ted succeeds if, given any pair      , he can 
determine whether      
    
. We present an outline of a proof that Ted is unable to do so. 
Let U, V be PPT algorithms as follows: 
U, given input  , returns the unique entry    in DBa for which      
     . 
V, given input  , returns an entry    in DBa for which      
    .  
For any set *        
          
    +, with     , there exist     such that  
     
         
    
Simply set            and           . 
Because      ( )      ( ) are symmetric encryptions of     respectively, the probability 
distributions of            are computationally indistinguishable.  
Therefore, Ted is computationally unable to distinguish between U and V. 
 
A more detailed proof will be forthcoming. 
6   Future work 
6.1   Efficiency 
As mentioned, the simplistic approach given is very inefficient. A proposal to improve the 
efficiency would be to identify each record by several keys, which would allow a binary search. 
For example, take a database with 8 records -      through     .  
Alice’s secret key would be (     
        
        
  ).  
Set        
    ,        
   ,        
   ,        
    ,        
   ,        
    . 
Then record     , for example, would be identified by                ; while record      would be 
identified by                .  
Alice’s secret key would be (     
        
        
  ).  
To inquire about record      , Alice chooses (        )       and sends (  
         
  )  
(   
         
  )  and (  
         
  ) to Bob. 
A more detailed analysis of this improvement is out of scope and will be dealt with in a future 
paper. 
6.2   Cardinal Aggregation 
Cardinal aggregation can also be dealt with by dividing the information up on a “need to know” 
basis among several different databases. For example, the personnel database for the entire Canadian 
Armed Forces might be split up among the different military bases and ships. The Personnel Officer 
for CFB Cold Lake would have no access to the personnel database for HMCS Halifax. 
Double Blind Comparisons might be useful in this scenario for synchronizing databases when a 
service member is being posted from one unit to another. Further analysis of this scenario will be 
dealt with in a future paper. 
6.3   Anonymous Credentials 
An electronic credential is issued to a user by one organization (the issuer) that enables the user to 
demonstrate to a third party (the verifier) that the user possesses some attribute. With anonymous 
credentials [2][3][4], a user is able to obtain a credential from an issuing organization (possibly using 
a pseudonym) and use that credential to prove possession of some attribute to multiple verifiers, using 
different pseudonyms, in such a way that the issuer of the credential and the verifiers would be unable 
to link the transactions. 
Double Blind Comparisons might enable one organization (Alice) to prove to another organization 
(Bob) that a user (Carol) possesses some attribute or attributes (e.g. a Secret security clearance and a 
cryptographic public key) without revealing any more information to either Alice or Bob than is 
strictly necessary.  
Further analysis of this usage will be dealt with in a future paper. 
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